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INTERCEPTION AND OFFSHORE 
PROCESSING OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
DIMENSIONS 
An Introduction to Volume 9 of UTS Law Review 
Sam Blay*, jennifer Burn** and Patrick Keyzer* * * 
For decades the international community has conducted a delicate and politically charged balancing act trying to reconcile the inexorable 
increase in refugees-and the need to find permanent homes for them-
with the fundamental right of all countries to have secure frontiers. While 
the notion of non-refoulement remains fundamental to the treatment of 
asylum seekers, their rights vis a vis the states in which they seek asylum 
are significantly circumscribed by their alien status. States have a right 
to control entry to their territories. In the development of asylum law 
and policy, the central difficulty for states, and indeed the international 
community, is how to construct an appropriate balance between the urgent 
humanitarian demands to protect those who are genuinely in need of 
asylum, and the exclusion of those who do not qualify for humanitarian 
protection. For the last two or more decades, this central difficulty has 
been exacerbated by the development of people trafficking and smuggling. 
The concern with the construction and maintenance of asylum policies 
that are humane yet politically viable cuts across the traditional distinction 
between states such as Australia, the United States and Canada that have 
traditionally courted immigration, and those such as the United Kingdom 
and Germany that have discouraged it. On the other hand, all these states 
have traditionally had open immigration and refugee processing procedures. 
The task in international law is how to construct an acceptable interception 
framework that accommodates the right of a state to exclude entry into 
its territory without undermining the humanitarian imperatives of non-
refoulement and related obligations under the Rifugee Convention. 
The problem with the Rifugee Convention is that it is territorial in its 
application. While article 33 enshrines the notion of non-refoulement and 
article 32 sets out the related obligations of contracting states not to expel 
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a refugee who is in their territory except on grounds of national security 
or public order with due process of law, under article 32 does not define 
nor provide guidance as to what constitutes 'entry' into the territory of a 
state or arrival at the frontier of a state. More significantly, it provides no 
proper indication of the scope of the state parties' obligations with respect 
to their treatment of asylum seekers outside their territorial boundaries. 
The result is that states anxious to restrict refugee influx apply exclusionary 
strategies to deny 'entry' into their territories. 
In general, a state may use a combination of 'offshore' and 'onshore' 
administrative measures and strategies to regulate the admission of aliens 
and in particular asylum seekers into its territory. The offshore strategies 
or measures available to a state may be described in these terms: 
There are three main forms of 'offshore' exclusionary strategies: the 
most basic form is interception, which denies the asylum-seeker access 
to the territory of a prospective receiving state and thereby excludes the 
asylum-seeker from seeking protection from that state. Another strategy 
is to define 'entry' restrictively by excluding or excising part or parts of a 
state's territory from 'entry' into the state for the purposes of immigration 
and for seeking asylum for that matter. Thirdly, a state may attempt to 
deny or prevent entry of asylum-seekers into its territory by diverting, 
encouraging or causing their transfer into the territory of another state. 
By their nature, all three exclusionary strategies have the potential to 
undermine the humanitarian character of the Convention and are of 
doubtful legal validity. Where these strategies are adopted without 
adequate justification, a state runs the risk of breaching its obligations 
under the Convention.• 
Where an asylum seeker manages to secure entry into a state, there 
are yet onshore strategies that the state may adopt to discourage or limit 
asylum applications. Members of the Rifugee Convention are obliged by it 
to undertake to process asylum seekers in the territory of a contracting 
state. However, there is no international standard as such for the pro-
cessing of asylum seekers, beyond the minimum requirements set in 
the recommendations the Executive Committee of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees' Programme (the UNHCR Executive 
Committee) in 1977.2 While the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Rifugee Status also provides basic guidance on determination procedures, 
Sam Blay, 'Restrictive Trends in Migration Flows: A Post Card from Australia', (2006) 
2( I) joumal of Migration and Refugee Issues, 29-42. 
2 Such minimum standards for status determination include the issuing of appropriate 
instructions to the competent officials in dealing with asylum seekers, the provision 
of necessary guidance to asylum seekers, and the clear identification of the authority 
to deal with asylum applications (see UNHCR Handbook 011 Procedures and Criteria for 
Detemzining Refugee Status HCR/IP/4/Eng!REY.I, re-edited, para 192 (Geneva, January 
1992). 
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it admits that it is not possible to prescribe identical determination 
procedures for signatory states to the Convention. The Handbook notes 
that it is left to each state 'to establish the procedure that it considers 
most appropriate, having regard to its particular constitutional and 
administrative structure'.3 The processing procedures adopted by states 
therefore vary. More importantly, it is possible for a state to adopt 
restrictive onshore procedures that discourage asylum applications. Such 
measures may consist of' administrative' or 'immigration' detention. It may 
also include specific limitations on administrative or review proceedings 
in the status determination process. 
Australia has adopted a combination of onshore and offshore strategies 
to deal with the arrival of asylum seekers. In specific terms, the strategies 
include: the excision of territory, the interception and processing of 
asylum seekers offshore in neighbouring Pacific states through the 'Pacific 
Solution', mandatory detention, temporary protection visas and the use 
of the privative clause to limit access to judicial review. 
This volume of the UTS Law Review is a collection of essays on some 
of the significant aspects of restrictive practices relating to the treatment 
of asylum seekers. 
The essays are the result of the deliberations and discussions of a two 
day international conference organised as part of a research project funded 
by an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant awarded to us as chief 
investigators. The essence of the project and indeed the conference was not 
so much to dispute the right of a state to restrict undocumented arrivals 
in its territory, but to investigate and highlight the legitimate parameters 
within which a state can restrict such arrivals. The conference was unique 
in that it brought together distinguished international academics in asylum 
law; and more importantly Australian legal practitioners who have been 
involved in and litigated some of the most controversial cases in Australian 
asylum law that cover the complex mix of Australia's onshore and offshore 
restrictive practices in dealing with asylum seekers. The result is an 
excellent intellectual and practical discourse that provides a rich insight 
into the controversial questions underpinning Australian asylum law and 
practice. 
Once asylum seekers depart their states of origin, the prospective 
destination state wishing to restrict or prevent their arrival at its shores is 
left with a primary strategy: interception. Indeed, interception as such is 
a primary precursor to the offshore processing of asylum seekers because 
processing offshore necessarily involves the 'interception' of the asylum 
seekers before they enter the territory of the state (or in Australia's case, 
the Migration Zone). The discourse on offshore processing and the 
attendant legal issues must therefore necessarily begin with the question 
3 Ibid, para 189. 
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of interception. This introductory commentary is therefore devoted to 
interception as a general prologue to the essays in the volume. 
Interception: The Genesis of a Restrictive Culture in 
Dealing with Asylum Seekers 
Interception is the most basic exclusionary strategy which may be employed 
by a state. It denies the asylum seeker access to the territory of the state 
and thereby excludes the asylum seeker from seeking protection from the 
state or limits the asylum seeker's access to protection. 4 
A graphic illustration of interception as an exclusionary strategy was the 
September 200 l case of the Tampa, a Norwegian container carrier which 
was intercepted in Australian territorial waters and denied permission 
to enter Australia with its cargo of some 460 refugees. While Australia's 
action attracted worldwide criticism, the Federal Court of Australia upheld 
the validity of the act and went so far as to endorse its consistency with 
the Rifugee Convention5. Interception is not practiced only by Australia. 
However, the Australian response to the Tampa highlights the fundamental 
difficulties associated with interception in international refugee law. 
However a state chooses to construct and operate interception asylum 
seekers, interception only provides the beginning of a far more complex 
issue in international law: how does a state manage the intercepted asylum 
seeker consistent with the state's international legal obligations? 
Interception: The Rationale 
In broad terms, interception is a common phenomenon in state practice. 
Interception occurs when a state prevents asylum seekers from reaching 
its territory to claim asylum. Interception can take the form of a direct 
'turn back' at a land border or the refusal to let a person off an aircraft on 
a runway. It can also consist of escorting a boat of aliens into international 
waters or to the territorial seas of another country. In its most common 
form, states routinely 'intercept' aliens at their frontiers through border 
controls and other types of immigration restrictions or visa requirements. 
In its extreme forms and with particular reference to asylum seekers, states 
use their navies or coast guards to patrol their maritime zones to deny 
aliens direct entry into their territories.6 
Interception activities can be categorised as either administrative or 
physical in nature. 7 Administrative measures include implementation of 
4 In the paper prepared for the Global Consultations discussion on asylum and migration, 
!OM states that 'Many States which have the ability to do so find that intercepting 
migrants before they reach their territories is one of the most effective measures to 
enforce their domestic migration laws and policies.' 
5 Ruddock v Vadar/is (200 I) I I 0 FCR 49 I (I 8 September 200 I). 
6 The 'Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations (AMIO)' of the US Coast Guard and Navy 
is a typical example. 
7 See UNHCR &Com, Interception of A~lum Seekers and Refugees, UN Doc. No. EC)50/SCJ 
CRP. 17, 9 June 2000, paragraphs I2 and I3. 
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visa requirements, carrier obligations, safe third country and country of 
first asylum determinations, the posting of immigration officials in other 
countries' transit points to identify false documents or suspicious migrants 
and the training and posting of airline officials at overseas airports and 
other transit hubs to screen documents and migrants prior to boarding.8 
Administrative interception also includes legislative action such as the 
creation of 'international zones' or 'excised' territories where more special 
immigration laws are put into force. Australia's post-Tampa legislation is 
one such example, wherein certain territories were legislatively excised 
from Australia's migration laws.9 
Physical interception is more limited and involves interference with 
vessels, usually in the maritime context, and may include the boarding, 
inspection, seizure, forfeiture and/or destruction of vessels. 10 
Whatever form of interception is adopted, the ultimate objective is the 
same: to deny entry to irregular migrants. Many states see interception as 
a highly effective means of preventing entry of undocumented persons as 
well as a tool for combating people smuggling and human trafficking. 11 The 
rationale behind interception is to reduce the incidence of people smuggling 
and misuse of the refugee determination system, which undermines its 
efficacy. This is especially the case since some of the undocumented 
arrivals travel from countries where they have already found a safe haven. 
As such, perceptions in some circles are that these people are not acting 
in a manner which upholds the spirit and principles of the resettlement 
regime. 12 States have also expressed concerns about the dangers and risks 
posed by people smugglers, especially when transporting asylum seekers 
in unseaworthy boats. Thus the argument is that interception can play a 
role in rescuing people, and hence save lives. 13 
The definition of interception under UNHCR Executive Committee 
Conclusion No. 97 adds an explicit humanitarian connotation by 
suggesting that interception 'also serves to protect the lives and security 
of the travelling public as well as persons being smuggled or transported 
in an irregular manner'. Humanitarian goals may be achieved in the 
interception of trafficking victims or smuggled persons exposed to serious 
8 See James C Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve, 'Fundamental Justice and the 
Deflection of Refugees from Canada' ( 1996) 34 Osgoode Hall Law fouma/213. 
9 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001. 
10 UNHCR, Interception of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees, above n 7, para 10. 
II See comments in 'The Global Consultations on International Protection', Incorporating 
Refugee Protection Safeguards into Interception Measures EC/GC/01/13 (31 May 2001). 
12 Ibid, para 14. 
13 Para 15. See for example, US Government site for Alien Migrant Interdiction and the 
Coast Guard <http://www.usg.miVhq/g-o/g-opVmle/AMIO.htm>: 'When successful, 
illegal immigration can potentially cost US taxpayers billions of dollars each year in 
social services. In addition to relieving this financial burden on our citizens, the Coast 
Guard's efforts help to support the use of legal migration systems. Primarily, the Coast 
Guard maintains its humanitarian responsibility to prevent the loss of life at sea, since the 
majority of migrant vessels are dangerously overloaded, unseaworthy or otherwise unsafe'. 
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harm, but the net result of interception activities is less clear. 14 
With the entry into force of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants 
by Land, Sea and Air, maritime interception was implicitly acknowledged 
as a legitimate tool for border control and enforcement (article 2). Article 
8 of the Protocol allows the search, boarding, and seizure of persons 
and cargo where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel 
is engaged in smuggling. The Protocol also permits boarding, search, 
and 'appropriate measures ... as authorized by the flag State' where the 
suspected vessel is under the jurisdiction of another state, and that State 
has given authorisation for search and boarding; and boarding and search 
where the suspected vessel is without nationality, 'in accordance with 
relevant domestic and international law.' (Articles 8(1), 8(2), 8(7).) 
In this instrument, interception is contemplated in a more cooperative 
context, where flag states may grant authorisation to foreign-flagged state 
vessels in order to facilitate interception of vessels suspected of smuggling 
vessels: article 8(4). This provision effectively dispenses with the concept 
of exclusive flag state jurisdiction by creating an interception-sharing 
scheme where authorised by the flag state. These provisions are exclusive 
to the maritime context of the Protocol, and include particular safeguards 
that include obligations to 'ensure the safety and humane treatment of 
persons on board' and 'not to endanger the security of the vessel or its 
cargo': articles 9(a), 9(b). 
Interception: The Current State of the Law 
Whatever its form, interception poses important challenges to international 
asylum law. By its very nature, it can result in the refoulement of persons 
in need of international protection. The denial of access to the territory of 
a contracting state under the Refugee Convention through interception can 
undermine the right to seek asylum in other countries, and to access full 
and fair asylum determination procedures. More importantly, interception 
often takes place in areas where there is little or no outside access or 
monitoring: for example in restricted airport transit zones, on ships at sea, 
or in remote locations. In spite of these problems and the persistent and 
ever increasing use of interception measures, the issue has received very 
little attention in the literature of international asylum law. 15 
In 2000, the Standing Committee of the Executive Committee of the 
14 See eg, Michael Pugh, 'Drowning Not Waving: Boat People and Humanitarianism 
at Sea' (2004) 17 Journal of Refugee Studies 50, 62. 
I 5 The few works on the subject have tended to be specific rather than general; statement 
of international law principles. See for instance: Bill Frelick, 'Haitian Boat Interdiction 
and Return: First Asylum and First Principles of Refugee Protection' (I 994) 26 Cornell 
International Law Journal, 675; Hiroshi Motomura, 'Haitian Asylum Seekers: Interdiction 
and Immigrants' Rights', Cornell International Law Journal. Among the more general works 
is the brief article by Francois Crepeau, 'International Cooperation on Interdiction of 
Asylum Seekers-A Global Perspective', found in the Canadian Council for Refugees, 
Interdicting Refugees, May I 998. 
12 
HeinOnline -- 9 UTS L. Rev. 13 2007
INTERCEPTION AND OFFSHORE PROCESSING OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 
UNHCR observed that there is no internationally accepted definition of 
interception. 16 Nevertheless, it suggested that the term can be defined as: 
encompassing all measures applied by a State, outside its national territory, 
in order to prevent, interrupt or stop the movement of persons without the 
required documentation crossing international borders by land, air or sea, 
and making their way to the country of prospective destination. 17 
This definition was far from satisfactory and underscored the lack of 
understanding of the substantive international legal issues that underpin 
interception. The Standing Committee's approach unduly emphasised the 
action taken by a state 'outside its national territory' to prevent or stop 
entry of persons. It overlooked the fact that a state can define or redefine 
'entry' for the purposes of immigration and for any claims under the Rifugee 
Convention to exclude sections of its territory as indeed Australia and the 
United States did later. In 2003 the Executive Committee adopted a wider 
definition and issued a Conclusion defining interception as: 
One of the measures employed by states to: (i) prevent embark-
ation of persons on an international journey; (ii) prevent further onward 
international travel by persons who have commenced their journey; or (iii) 
assert control of vessels where there are reasonable grounds to believe the 
vessel is transporting persons contrary to international or national maritime 
law; where, in relation to the above, the person or persons do not have the 
required documentation or valid permission to enter; and that such measures 
also serve to protect the lives and security of the travelling public as well as 
persons being smuggled or transported in an irregular manner ... 18 
The Executive Committee definition makes reference to physical 
interception practices, relating to 'control of vessels' in contrast to the 
implied reference to 'all measures' proposed by UNHCR in 2000. More 
significantly, it drops the extraterritorial element from the definition. 
International Obligations towards Intercepted 
Asylum Seekers 
Interception can have significant consequences for asylum seekers. This 
is because interception measures normally make no distinction between 
illegal migrants who are merely pursuing better economic conditions, 
16 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 'Interception of 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees: The International Framework and Recommendations 
for a Comprehensive Approach', 9 June 2000, EC/50/SCICRP/1 7, para 10. Also, note 
that the term 'interdiction' is sometimes used interchangeably or as an alternative to 
'interception', especially in US sources. 
17 Interception of Aiflum-Seekers and Refugees: The Intemational Framework and Recommendation 
for a Comprehensive Approach ECI50/SR!CRP.l7. 
18 See UNHCR ExCom, Conclusion No. 97. This definition maintains the focus on 
State intent to interrupt movement by undocumented persons. Other activities such 
as detention within the intercepting State territory for irregular migrants awaiting 
processing, hearings, deportation, or removal would also be captured, suggesting that 
the new definition is overly broad. See Bill Frelick, 'Abundantly Clear: Refoulment' 
(2004) 19 Georgetown Immigration Law foumal 245, 251. 
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and those asylum seekers who are genuinely fleeing persecution. 19 The 
difficulties posed by interception for asylum law are well summed up by 
Professor Goodwin-Gill when he notes that: 
The refugee in international law occupies a legal space characterised, on the 
one hand, by the principle of State sovereignty and the related principles 
of territorial supremacy and self-preservation; and, on the other hand, by 
competing humanitarian principles deriving from general international law 
... and from treaty. 
It is indisputable that immigration control in general is a sovereign 
prerogative. On the one hand, it can thus easily be arguable that when a 
state intercepts an undocumented alien arriving at its borders, it is not 
because it has sought to deny the right to seek asylum but rather because 
it has sought to control its borders. It would follow that the 'mere' 
interception of an alien transiting or attempting to enter the border of a 
state may not necessary entitle the alien to protection from the state. If a 
state was obliged to hear and determine the claims of asylum seekers upon 
interception, even during transit while still outside its territorial border, 
then the state's obligation to hear their claims at that point would amount 
to a de facto obligation to authorise their entry. In essence, their claims 
themselves would become the conceptual equivalent of a visa subject 
to the determination of their claims. This would undermine the state's 
capacity to control its borders, because anyone making an asylum claim 
before the interdicting state's officials (or agents thereof) will be entitled 
thereby to continue their in-bound journey and enter to have the claim 
processed. 20 
On the other hand it can be argued equally strongly that the sovereign 
right of a state to protect its borders including the right of interception to 
prevent entry into its territory must be read and interpreted in conjunction 
with its obligations under convention and customary international law. In 
particular, the interception protocols of states must conform to international 
human rights standards, and where asylum seekers are involved, with their 
obligations under the Rifugee Convention. The relevant obligation of the 
state may be assessed best under two types of interceptions: intervention 
(for the purposes of preventing entry) and rescue interception (to assist 
those in distress, for instance at sea). 
Rescue Interception at Sea 
A state may engage in interception by' default' particularly in circumstances 
where asylum seekers are in distress at sea. As was demonstrated in the case 
of the MVTampa, rescue interception brings into play complex legal issues 
that impact on the intercepting state, the shipping industry and ultimately 
19 Para 17. 
20 G Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in Intemational Law ( 1996) 157. 
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the asylum seekers in distress.21 Just as the principle of non-refoulement 
lies at the very core of refugee law, the requirement for assisting people in 
distress at sea is a cornerstone of maritime law. There is general acceptance 
that a vessel in distress may enter the territorial waters of a state in search 
of assistance.22 Furthermore explicit international legal obligations relating 
to aiding people in peril at sea are set out in: 
• the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 ('UNCLOS') 
• the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 197 4 (as 
amended) ('SOLAS') 
• the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue of 1979 (as 
amended) ('SAR') 
• the 1958 Convention on the High Seas (insofar as it has not been over-
ridden by UNCLOS). 23 
The numbers of people, mode of transport, or status of people in 
question are immaterial and have no impact on the obligations to assist 
people in distress at sea. 24 A relevant example of these express provisions 
is found in paragraph 2.1.1 0 of chapter 2 of the Annex to SAR: 
Parties shall ensure that assistance be provided to any person in distress 
at sea. Thry shall do so regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or 
the circumstances in which that person is found. 25 [emphasis added] 
Ship masters, coastal states, flag states and international organisations 
all have a role to play in upholding these obligations. Ship masters are 
obliged by international law to render assistance, to provide assistance 
and/or rescue. Failure to comply with this requirement may lead to criminal 
penalties in some national jurisdictions, such as in the United Kingdom 
and Germany. Furthermore, the ship master must ensure the general 
safety of his vessel,26 whilst coastal states must develop adequate search 
and rescue services27 and flag states must uphold international maritime 
law.28 Indeed the issue with respect to rescue interception is not whether 
there is an obligation to rescue or not. An obligation to rescue exists in 
conventional law and can plainly be justified on humanitarian grounds. 
The issue in asylum law is what happens after the rescue. 
2 I A similar view was adopted by Beaumont J in Ruddock v Vadarlis (includes corrigendum 
dated 20 September 200 I) [200 I] FCA I 329 (I 8 September 200 I) [I I 0] in relation 
to the jurisdiction of the court and the right of the rescuees in the Tampa to enter 
Australia. 
22 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 'Background Note on the Protection 
of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Rescued at Sea', 18 March 2002, para I. 
23 OJ Devine, 'The Cape's False Bay: A Possible Haven for Ships in Distress' (I 99 I) 16 
South African Yearbook of International Law 8 I, 84; A V Lowe, The Right of Entry into 
Maritime Ports in International Law' (I 997) I 4 San Diego Law Review 597, 6 I 0. 
24 Ibid, paras 4-5. 
25 Above n 22, para 5. 
26 Above n 22, para 5 and footnote 1 of 'Background Note'. 
27 Above n 22, para 6; see also Australia's Navigation Act 1912 (Cth), ss 265, 3I7A. 
28 Above n 22, para 7. 
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After Rescue: The Legal Void 
The question of responsibility for processing and possible resettlement 
of rescued asylum seekers is problematic. A major flaw in international 
maritime law is that none of the legislative instruments sets out the 
procedure to be followed after a rescue has taken place.29 Faced with this 
lack of legal provision, the UNHCR argues for 'prompt disembarkation 
at the next port of call'.30 However, in this regard, the term 'next port 
of call' is not defined in any instrument. It is suggested by the UNHCR 
that the 'next port of call' would need to be the nearest port in situations 
where there are large numbers of people and safety concerns. Another 
suggestion is that the point of embarkation could also serve as the point 
of disembarkation since that state has obligations to stop unseaworthy 
vessels from travelling from its territory. Further possibilities include the 
next scheduled port of call, or even a further port with better facilities in 
its territory for traumatised or injured persons. In situations where state 
vessels have intercepted illegal immigrants, the nearest port of that state 
could be the most suitable place for disembarkation.31 
Factors identified by the UNHCR which bear on the disembarkation 
of rescued people, especially asylum seekers and refugees, encompass: 
• legal obligations 
• practical, security and humanitarian concerns 
• commercial interests.32 
The UNHCR further states: 
It is crucial that ship masters are actively facilitated in their efforts to save 
lives, confident that safe and timely disembarkation will be guaranteed.33 
At the same time, the UNHCR recognises the valid concerns of states 
when some of those rescued include asylum seekers, since following these 
guidelines could: 'result in a strain on their asylum systems, encourage 
irregular movement and even contribute to smuggling operations'.34 
Where rescues at sea include individuals seeking international 
protection, the mechanisms and principles of international refugee law 
do apply. States' obligations under refugee law apply as soon as it is 
29 Above n 22, para 8. 
30 Above n 22, paras I 1-12. 
31 Aboven22,paral2. 
32 In the Australian Tampa incident of 200 I, 140 of the people rescued by the Tampa 
were accepted by New Zealand and have been granted refugee status as well as 
assistance with housing and education. The Tampa incident instigated the 'Pacific 
Solution' in Australia, whereby asylum seekers are processed offshore, with camps 
established at Nauru and the Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island. The Pacific 
States do not undertake the responsibility for processing, the UNHCR and Australian 
immigration officials do. For a brief summary, see <http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/ 
asia-pacific/1802364.stm>. 
33 UNHCR (2002) Background Note on the Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees Rescued at 
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clear asylum seekers have been rescued. UNHCR Executive Committee 
Conclusions include: 
In all cases, the fundamental principle of non-refoulement including-non-
rejection at the frontier-must be scrupulously observed'.35 
Later EXCOM Conclusions restate: 
the need to admit refugees to the territory of States, which includes no rejec-
tion at frontiers without access to fair and efficient procedures for determin-
ing status and protection needs. 36 
The UNHCR states that for procedures to be fair and efficient, after 
prompt disembarkation, it is necessary to (i) identify which rescued 
individuals seek asylum and (ii) identify which state is responsible for 
processing those asylum claimsY 
The method of lodging an asylum application when at sea is unclear.38 
The UNHCR generally prefers asylum processing to take place on terra 
.finna because on board methods have been problematic in the past (e.g. 
due to physical conditions, lack of translators and legal counsel on board, 
lack of appeal procedures).39 In most situations, such as where there are 
large numbers of people or where their mental/physical state means that 
immediate processing is not appropriate, then it will continue to be the 
best option that the processing occurs after prompt disembarkation.40 
The question arises as to which state should be responsible for processing 
the claims for international protection. Normally, this will be the state 
where disembarkation occurs.41 However, the flag state (of the rescue 
vessel) could also bear the main responsibility towards the asylum seekers 
in circumstances where (a) the asylum seekers clearly were intending to 
seek asylum in that state; or (b) where there are small numbers of asylum 
seekers and it may be reasonable for them to remain on board until the 
ship reaches the territory of its flag state; or (c) disembarkation could occur 
at a transitional third state without that state adopting any responsibility 
towards the processing of the asylum seekers. 
A further strong argument for the flag state to bear responsibility is 
where it is involved in interception measures, even on the high seas, since 
there is a nexus between the original intended destination of the asylum 
seeker and the deliberate intervention by the flag State to stop the asylum 
seeker from reaching the final destination.42 
35 Above n 32, para 26. 
36 EX COM Conclusion No. 22, I 981, Part II A, para 2, cited at para 18 of Background 
Notes. 
3 7 EX COM Conclusion No. 85 ( 1998) para q, also cited at para 18 of Background Notes. 
EX COM Conclusion No. 82 ( 1997) also contains almost identical wording. 
38 Above n 36, para 20. 
39 Above n 36, para 21. 
40 Above n 36, para 23. 
4I Above n 36, para 24. 
42 Above n 36, para 25. 
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Some directives can be found in the Executive Committee 
Conclusions: 
It is the humanitarian obligation of all coastal States to allow vessels in dis-
tress to seek haven in their waters and to grant asylum, or at least temporary 
refuge, to persons on board wishing to seek asylum.43 
In accordance with international practice, supported by the relevant 
international instruments, persons rescued at sea should normally be 
disembarked at the next port of call. This practice should also be applied 
to asylum-seekers rescued at sea. In cases of large scale influx, asylum-
seekers rescued at sea should always be admitted, at least on a temporary 
basis. States should assist in facilitating their disembarkation by acting 
in accordance with the principles of international solidarity and burden-
sharing in granting resettlement opportunities.44 
The Executive Committee conclusions have two important features. 
First they do not purport to state a general position in international law 
that imposes specific legal obligations on states to settle or admit and 
process asylum seekers. Second, whatever the conclusions purport to say, 
they are in the nature of recommendations and at most a statement of 
'soft law'. The current international legal position does not impose any 
obligation on the rescuing state to admit, process or resettle rescued asylum 
seekers. In Ruddock v Vadarlis Beaumont J was of a similar opinion when 
he observed: 
whilst customary international law imposes an obligation upon a coastal 
state to provide humanitarian assistance to vessels in distress, international 
law imposes no obligation upon the coastal state to resettle those rescued in 
the coastal state's territory. This accords with the principles of the Refugee 
Convention. By Art 33, a person who has established refugee status may not 
be expelled to a territory where his life and freedom would be threatened for 
a Convention reason. Again, there is no obligation on the coastal state to 
resettle in its own territory. Any extra-judicial assessment of Executive policy 
in the present circumstances should be seen in this context.45 
French J agreed and with this view and added: 
The primary obligation which Australia has to refugees to whom the Con-
vention applies is the obligation under Article 33 not to expel or return them 
to the frontiers of territories where their lives or freedoms would be threat-
ened on account of their race, religion, nationality, or membership of a par-
ticular social group or their political opinions ... In this case, in my opinion, 
the question is moot because nothing done by the Executive on the face of it 
amounts to a breach of Australia's obligations in respect of non-refoulement 
under the Refugee Convention.46 
43 Above n 36, para 26. 
44 EXCOM Conclusion No. 15 ( 1979) para c, cited in Background Paper, para 28. 
45 (2001) 110 FCR491, 126. 
46 Ruddock v Vadar/is (includes corrigendum dated 20 September 200 I) (200 I) II 0 FCR 
491, 125 
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Interception for the Purposes of Preventing Entry 
A5 noted earlier, it is the sovereign right of a state to regulate entry into 
its territory. The interception of an undocumented attempt to enter the 
territory of a state is therefore a legitimate exercise of sovereign authority 
and the right of a state to protect its borders. A5 in the case of rescue 
interception, the issue is not whether a state is entitled to intercept 
undocumented arrivals or not; the issue concerns the international legal 
obligations that are triggered once a state intercepts asylum seekers before 
they enter its territory. 
This underlying precept of refugee law is that a person with a legitimate 
claim to refugee status must not be sent back to the country in which he 
or she was subjected to persecution. This of course is the essence of non 
refoulement and provides the foundation of the primary obligation of states 
in asylum law. The right of a state to intercept undocumented arrivals 
including asylum seekers is subject to the non refoulement obligation. 
Interception of asylum seekers before entry into the territory of the 
state, while seemingly an extraterritorial activity, may not necessarily 
excuse a state from its non-rifoulement obligation. Admittedly, Article 33 
'does not affirmatively establish a duty on the part of states to receive 
refugees' and 'State parties may therefore deny entry to refugees so long 
as there is no real chance that their refusal will result in the return of the 
refugee to face the risk of being persecuted.'47 This interpretation relies 
on the qualification that, where rejection at the frontier involves any real 
risk of harm, 'Article 33 amounts to a de facto duty to admit the refugee, 
since admission is normally the only means of avoiding the alternative, 
impermissible consequence of exposure to risk.' Under this reading, article 
33 is not violated where refugees are rejected at the border, unless such 
rejection involves any real risk of return. In the maritime context, where 
private commercial vessels have undertaken a legal duty to rescue those 
in distress at sea, refusal of disembarkation would result in an unknown 
final destination-something that, depending on the proximity of the 
persecuting State to later disembarkation points, could qualify as an 
'impermissible ... exposure to risk. '48 
It is well settled under international law that a provision of national law 
cannot justify a breach of international law that is binding on the state.49 
Likewise, a state's national law on immigration and immigration control 
must not be implemented in a way which breaches its obligations under 
international customary law or treaties to which it is a party. In effect, 
under such an interpretation, all refugees arriving by sea who manage to 
47 See James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law 355 (2005) 
(characterising interception as 'extraterritorial refoulement') 301,355. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Under US law however, the 'last in time' principle governs conflicts between treaties 
and national laws. 
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reach a state's territorial waters should accordingly be granted entry to 
the territory itself. 
The object and purpose of the Convention itself would be rendered 
meaningless if states could sidestep legal safeguards by moving their actions 
outside of their territory. The plain language of article 33 explicitly bans 
refoulement 'in any manner whatsoever,' and the view that the provision 
has extraterritorial effect has been supported by the UNHCR in a variety 
of contexts, including an amicus curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Sale v Haitian Centers Council Inc. 5° 
According to Professor Hathaway, refugees are entitled to a range of 
rights, the nature and extent of which depend on the refugee's level of 
attachment to the asylum state.s' He argues that article 33 is among 'a 
small number of core rights' that apply to asylum seekers regardless of 
their 'level of attachment' to a state territory, so that certain rights and 
protections inhere even before a refugee reaches a particular state, where 
a refugee is merely subject to a state's jurisdiction. Drawing on both the 
text of the Convention and general principles of public international law, 
he concludes that, 'the governments of state parties are bound to honour 
these rights not only in territory over which they have formal, de jure 
jurisdiction, but equally in places where they exercise effective or de facto 
jurisdiction outside their own territory. '52 This would include situations 
in which a state's consular or other agents take control of persons abroad, 
such as the high seas. While state procedural bars may limit access to the 
courts, by means such as standing requirements, the geographic scope of 
article 33, while still debated, is likely to extend beyond state territory to 
State exercises of effective or de facto jurisdiction. 
Within this context, there are four basic options open to a state that 
intercepts asylum seeks attempting to enter its territory. Firstly, upon 
interception, the state may choose to escort the asylum seekers into its 
territory. Such an option will rarely be exercised by the state since it defeats 
the essential purpose of interception to prevent entry into the state. The 
second option is for the state to turn away the asylum seekers without 
regard to their final destination. While such an action technically falls 
short of breaching the obligation of non refoulement it is inconsistent 
with the humanitarian elements of international protection principles. 
More significantly, it carries a real risk that the asylum seekers turned 
away may eventually be returned to the countries of origin in breach of 
non refoulement. 
The third option for the state is to transfer the asylum seekers to a 
third state for resettlement. A fourth option is to transfer the asylum 
seekers to a third state or an offshore location with the view to processing 
50 509 U.S. 155, 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993). 
51 Above n 47, 304. 
52 Ibid, 169. 
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and determining their status. Australia has adopted the third and fourth 
options as the basis of the Pacific Solution in dealing with intercepted 
undocumented arrivals. 53 As Goodwin-Gill discusses in this volume, there 
is no clear prohibition on a state to transfer prospective asylum applicants 
to a third state where their lives are not endangered, for resettlement 
or processing and status determination. The transfer however must 
be consistent with specific international obligations. The scope of the 
international obligations on the state in the management of intercepted 
asylum seekers offshore is the focus of the essays in this volume. 
While the Tampa incident and subsequent legislation in Australia has 
made the country the focus of most discussions on interception, it needs 
to be noted that Australia is not alone in intercepting asylum seekers 
before they reach its shores. Australia however stands out because of its 
pursuit of the Pacific Solution. The practice by the United States parallels 
that of Australia in several respects. A brief survey of the US practice is 
thus useful. 
Interception in the USA 
For over two decades, the United States Coast Guard has engaged in 
'interdiction' measures, intended to facilitate prompt handling of undoc-
umented aliens by limiting their access to the US judicial system. The 
program follows US Supreme Court alienage jurisprudence which holds 
that 'an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a 
privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application for the 
power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative. '54 Moreover the 
judiciary has long held that domestic laws-including the Constitution-do 
not apply abroad except when mandated by Congress.55 Under US law 
the Executive has broad interpretive authority over terms and obligations 
of international agreements.56 The Supreme Court has agreed that for 
the purposes of US law, the UN Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees ('Refugee Protocol') does not require a state to offer protection 
to refugees beyond its borders. 57 A presidential order to the Coast Guard 
to intercept vessels on the high seas illegally transporting migrants to the 
USA, without first determining whether they may qualify as refugees, 
does not involve either the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 1952), which 
53 This also underlies the recent Australian-US accord to transfer aliens to each other's 
jurisdiction, discouraging refugees who may wish to join family members in their 
original destinations, but technically not violating the refoulement principle. 
54 Landon v Plasencia 459 US 21, 32 ( 1982). 
55 See eg, Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. 488 US 428, 440 ( 1989). 
('When it desires to do so, Congress knows how to place the high seas within the 
jurisdictional reach of a statute.') The US treaty approval regime starkly limits the 
efficacy of international agreements without enabling legislation; only in exceptional 
instances do international agreemetns give rise to a cause of action. 
56 United States v Curtiss- Wright &port Corp. 299 US 304 ( 1936). 
57 Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc. 509 US 155, 178-79 ( 1993). 
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governs and provides protection for asylum seekers and refugees, or the 
Refugee Protocol. Because of the discretion afforded to the Coast Guard 
and of judgements limiting the territorial effect of US obligations under 
Refugee Protocol, aliens interdicted on the high seas have little recourse 
to US courts to challenge actions of Coast Guard personnel or decisions 
made as to their refugee status. With respect to undocumented arrivals 
generally the US Coast Guard bluntly states: 
Thousands of people try to enter this country illegally every year using mari-
time routes, many via smuggling operations Interdicting migrants at sea means 
thry can be quick!J' retumed to their countries of origin without the cost!J' processes 
required if thry successful!J' enter the United States [emphasis added]. 
Where asylum seekers are found to be among the illegal migrants, the 
Coast Guard states: 
the Department of State (Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration) 
and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services establish the poli-
cies in this area and handle all potential asylum cases on our cutters. 58 
According to a press release of the Coast Guard from late 2002, migrants 
intercepted at sea in the US: 
remain in Coast Guard custody, receiving food, water and medical care if 
necessary and will normal!J' be repatriated back to their country of origin according 
to existing policies. 59 
Immigration officials have wide discretion in crafting policies without 
Congressional debate and can thus respond quickly to perceived urgency. 
Illegal mass migrations of Cubans and Haitians have been of particular 
concern to US authorities and various large scale operations have been 
implemented at times of mass influx, such as during the early 1980s and 
early 1990s.60 Undocumented arrivals from China and the Dominican 
Republic have also been a focus of the US Coast Guard's operations. 61 
The US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has developed 
policies specifically directed at illegal Cuban migrants. 62 In 1995, the Cuban 
and US governments signed a migration accord, which means that Cuban 
nationals intercepted by the US Coast Guard in either US or international 
waters are returned to Cuba.63 However, if asylum seekers are included in 
those people intercepted, the US Coast Guard reports that they then: 
58 Ibid. 
59 (Emphasis added) Washington File, 14 November 2002 'Coast Guard Repatriates 239 
Migrants to Haiti': < http://usinfo.state.gov/regionaVar/islands/02 I 11402.htm>. 
60 See Executive Order 12807 ( 1992) authorising interdiction of Caribbean refugees. 
61 US Coast Guard, 'Overview' <http://www/uscg.miVhq/g-o/g-opVmle/AMIO.htm>. 
62 INS ceased to exists on I March 2003 in the federal government's reorgansiation 
to create the Department of Homeland Security. INS functions are now divided 
amongst the US Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection. 
63 Immigration and Naturalization Service, Transcript of INS Telephone Message 'Cuban 
Migration Interdiction Process': <http://www.immigration.gov/text/shared/lawenfor/ 
interdiction.htm >. 
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have the opportunity to speak with a specially trained INS asylum officer. 
This officer sends the information provided by each individual to INS Head-
quarters in Washington where senior INS officers determine whether the 
individual has a 'credible fear of persecution'. 
People on board the Coast Guard cutter who are found to have a credible 
fear of persecution are transferred to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba. After having been interviewed a second time at Guantanamo 
Bay, those found to have legitimate protection concerns are resettled in 
third countries by the Department of State and not in the US, even though 
they may have close family in that country.64 
Since 1982, the US Coast Guard has intercepted no less that 225,626 
undocumented arrivals in its waters.65 The table below provides a detailed 
account of US interception activities since 1982: 
Total interdictions by US Coast Guard, in fiscal years ending 
30 June, as at 5 November 2007 
As of: 5 November, 2007 
Fiscal Haitian Dominican PRC Cuban Mexican Other Ecuadorian Total Year 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 171 0 0 0 0 0 0 171 
1983 511 6 0 44 0 5 0 566 
1984 1581 181 0 7 2 37 0 1808 
1985 3721 113 12 51 0 177 0 4074 
1986 3422 189 11 28 74 0 3725 
1987 2866 40 0 46 38 0 2991 
1988 4262 254 0 60 11 13 0 4600 
1989 4902 664 5 257 30 5 0 5863 
1990 871 1426 0 443 95 0 2836 
1991 2065 1007 138 1722 0 58 0 4990 
1992 37618 588 181 2066 0 174 0 40627 
1993 4270 873 2511 2882 0 48 0 10584 
1994 25302 232 291 38560 0 58 0 64443 
1995 909 3388 509 525 0 36 0 5367 
1996 2295 6273 61 411 0 38 2 9080 
1997 288 1200 240 421 0 45 0 2194 
1998 1369 1097 212 903 30 37 0 3648 
1999 1039 583 1092 1619 171 24 298 4826 
2000 1113 499 261 1000 49 44 1244 4210 
64 Ibid. 
65 From < http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comreVfactfile/index.htm >. 
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Fiscal Haitian Dominican PRC Cuban Mexican Other Ecuadorian Total Year 
2001 1391 659 53 777 17 31 1020 3948 
2002 1486 177 80 666 32 55 1608 4104 
2003 2013 1748 15 1555 0 34 703 6068 
2004 3229 5014 68 1225 86 88 1189 10899 
2005 1850 3612 32 2712 55 45 1149 9455 
2006 1198 3011 31 2810 52 91 693 7886 
2007 1610 1469 73 2868 26 165 125 6336 
2008 0 87 0 232 0 8 0 327 
Grand 111352 34390 5876 63890 564 1523 8031 225626 Total 
Source: <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comreVfactfile/index.htm> (8 November 2007) 
Conclusion 
Interception, the Pacific Solution and offshore processing have become 
part of the controversial landscape of Australian asylum law. As Professor 
Rubenstein argues in this volume, 'When a community determines who 
can come into its territory ... it reflects upon and reaches ... deep into the 
heart of the national political community and profoundly affects the nature 
of relations among those residing within.' If the scope of the problem with 
offshore processing is anything to go by, then Australia needs a big heart to 
deal with the humanitarian issues that come with interception and offshore 
processing. There are now significant indications that Australia's Pacific 
Solution and offshore processing strategy generally may have provided 
inspiration to other states looking for ways of restricting migration inflows. 
This does not augur well for asylum seekers, or for the health of principles 
of international protection. As Azadeh Dastyari argues in this volume, the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Australia 
on the swapping of refugees between Guantanamo and the Nauru has 
added an unusual dimension to the complex issue of offshore processing. 
As asylum law scholars and refugee advocates are left to ponder the logic 
of the Memorandum of Understanding, Justice John Von Doussa and 
Elizabeth Biok bring their wealth of experience from the bench and the bar 
to remind us that in the effort to exercise the sovereign right to protect its 
borders, a state is necessarily constrained in 'exporting deterrence' by the 
imperatives of international human rights standards. What is frequently 
overlooked in the asylum debate is that if the decision to admit an asylum 
seeker goes to the heart of the nation as Professor Rubenstein argues, then 
the plea for acceptance and the drawn-out process that offshore processing 
necessarily involves affect the mental capacity and stability of the asylum 
seeker. Claire O'Connor, who has considerable experience representing 
asylum seekers, reminds us in graphic terms of the humanitarian and 
mental health issues that flow from a punitive approach to preventive 
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detention. In the final analysis, asylum law is as much about politics and 
legislation as it about litigation. With his involvement in the celebrated 
case of Plaintif.!S157/200l, the Honourable Duncan Kerr SC MP brings 
his parliamentary and legal expertise together to provide an insight to the 
complexities of privative clause litigation and the role of the Australian 
courts in dealing with the ever evolving terrain of asylum law. 
For those of who attended the two day conference, it was a unique 
opportunity to experience first hand the accounts by Julian Burnside QC in 
his many endeavours to assist asylum seekers to find a voice, and to witness 
the intense questioning of the Immigration Minister's representative by 
several NGOs. We hope that the collection of essays in this volume in at 
least a small measure brings to our readers some of the many insights that 
were exchanged at the conference. 
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